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In the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah

iDEL S. ASHWORTII and
JOE H. ASHWORTII, d.b.a.
ASHWORTH ARCHITECTS,
a partnership,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

vs.

CASE
NO. 10679

GENE GLOVER, db.a.
GFJNIE BOYS,
Defendant and Respondent.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF OASE
This is an action for compensatory damages for unlawful conversion and unautlhorized use of architectural drawings and ideas belonging rto the Appellants and for punitive damages for theft and wilful misoonduct for unlawful
conversion and use of these valuable property rights.
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DISPOSmON IN LOWER OOURT
The court granted judgment for tlhe Defendant and
tlhen denied tlhe Appellants' (Plainrtifi' below) motion for
new trial.

REIJEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Appellants seek an order to amend 1Jhe Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree to conform to the
facts proven and an order to enter judgment for the Plaintiff; or, in the alternative, Appellants seek a reversal of
the judgment below and an order remanding the case to
the lower court for a new trial.

STATEMENT OF FAC11'1
In 1960 Appellants, an architectural firm, designed a
building to be used as a drive--in restaurant for Allen's Products, Inc., operator of a chain of drive-in restaurants called
Hi-Spots or Hi-Spot !Drive-Ins. The plans for tms building
were entirely unique and creative, involving new combinations of structural materials, color, dimensions and other
architectural features in such a way that it was to ·be easily
distinguishable from any other building. In preparing the
plans, 1Jhe Appellants also made extensive studies to achieve
a design which would be economical and at 1Jhe same time
fit the particular aesthetic and commercial needs of a drivein chain. Illustrative of the many distinctive features of
the design was the large double--diamond roof, purposely
designed in 1Jhis unique fashion so it would become a symbol of the Hi-Spot Drive-Ins to ·the public.
Upon completioo, the Appellants permitted a small
number af copies to 1be used by Allen's Products and its
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building contractor and subcontractors in constructing the
Hi-Spot Drive-In in American Fork, Utah, since this is customary practice among architects and was necessary to
the construction of the building. To assure that the plans
would be returned and that their use would be limited to
this particular building each contractor desiring to bid on
the project was required to post a $25.00 deposit with the
Appellant to be given back when the plans were returned.
The testimony of the parties to the original oontract
is that it was on the A.I.A. form which contains a clause
providing that ownership of the plans 1is to remain in the
designer. Allen's Products recognized this when, in 1961,
they asked Appellants to design another building in Springville, Utah, similar, but with certain modifications, to the
Hi-Spot in American Fork. The Appellants followed the
customary architectural practice, in dealing with established
clients, of reducing the fee inasmuch as the original design
could be revised fur the same client.
In 1962, Respondent was considering beginning a driveLearning fom Owen G. Richardson, an employee of Aflen's Products and a long-time friend
of the Respondent, that a copy of the Hi-Spot plans oould
be obtained, he got the plans from Richardson, who was
then manager of the American Fork store, copied them in
detail, and later returned them. All of this was dooe without asking for or receiving authority from the architects,
even though Respondent was an experienced building contractor who was acquainted with the customs of the con-

in restaurant business.

struction industry.
Not long after 1Jhe plans were copied, Respondent finished a drive-in restaurant at approximately 7200 South
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State, Salt Lake County, Utah, which is almost identical
to the Hi-Spot Restaurants, both as to appearance and as
to structural design and measurements. Respondent admits that he used the copied plans to draft the plans from
which he constructed his building and that a great many
of even the small details were copied and incorporated into
the building. He also admits that the only architect he
used did not design the buiding (TR 29-30) .
Sometime after Richardson helped the Respondent get
possession of the plans, he went to work for the Respondent as Manager of the new drive-in on 7200 South State,
with the expectation that the employment would develop
into a business relationship with Respondent (TR 19, 11,
13).
ARGUMENT
INTRODUCTION
The lllla.Uthorized use of architectural plans is not a
subject whioh has been frequently :litigated 'in this country;
indeed, this is a case of first impression in Utah. The basic
conduct, nevertheless, has the ring of the familiar to it. Is
this not merly a repetition of ·the classic lawsuit in which
something of value has been taken from its lawful owner
without his consent, then used to the personal advantage
of the taker without just compensation of the owner?
In this case, the owner happens to be tJhe creator of
the valuable object. He makes his living principally by
preparing original ideas for use by his clients in 1Jhe form
of plans and specifications. The ideas, in their tangible
form, are valuable not only because they are original, but
because they have been put into a useful, technical form
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without which it would be impossible to reproduce the building.
The simple facts are that the Respondent needed a
proven design for his business, liked the Appellants' plans,
took them and copied rt:Jhem. He never wanted, sought, nor
obtained permission. The fact that Respondent got "permission" from his friend Richardson cannot relieve him of
responsibility. Since the plans belonged to Ashworth Architects and carried ·their name, it was not Richardson's
right to allow Respondent to take the plans, particularly
since he knew why the plans were being taken (TR 15).

Not only was Richardson utterly without authority to
give away Appellants' plans; even if he had possessed this
authority, his acti<J1I1S were suspect in view of the fact that
Richardson expected to go into busines.5 with Respondent
at the time he delivered the rplans (TR 19) and there is
considerable evidence of a fraudulent conspiracy to pirate
the plans (TR 11, 12, 13). This is not a case of an innocent oversight by a novice to the building world; this was
a wilful, brazen conspiracy by an experienced profesffional
contractor and his "inside man" to purloin a proven commercial design, the creative work product of anotlher, without the usual necessity of giving just compensation to its
creator.
There is nothing inequitable about expecting Respondent to pay for what he uses. In the classic case the solution is simple: the wrongdoer is required to fully compensate the owner and maker of the valued object for its use.
This is what Appellants ask for today; and this is what
justice and equity demand.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I

THE DECISION OF THE COURT IS CONTRARY
TO LAW AND THE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ARE UNSUPPORTED BY THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.
POINT Il

THE COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT ARE ERRONEX>US AND IN DIRECT CONTRADICTION TO THE
EVIDENCE PRESENTED.
ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE DECISION O!F THE COURT IS CONT1RARY
TO LAW AND THE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ARE UNSUPPORTED BY THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.
Contrary to the decision of the lower court, the Appellants respectfully contend that they are the owners of the
plans, specifications, ideas, design and artistic concepts
from which the Respondent, Glover, constructed his building and on the date the Respondent obtained and copied
the plans prepared by the Appellants, the Appellants had
a copyright to the plans. There is no competent evidence
to the contrary, and, in addition to the testimony of Dell
S. Ashworth, there is other sustantial and beliewble evidence to this effect (Exhibits 1, 2 and 3) .
The only real issues of law before the Court today are
as follows:

Do the A:ppellants have a common law copyright in
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the ideas, concepts and artistic originations which it sells
by reason of its architectural license?
2. Have the Appellants lost their common law copyright by publication?
3. What, if any, are the damages of the .Appellants?
Addressing ourselves to the first two propositions, it
is respectfully contended that these matters are settled
by t:he cases of Smith vs. Paul, 174 Cal. App. 2d 744, 345
P2d 546, 77 ALR 1036, and Edgar H. Wood AssociatAls, Inc.
vs. Skeen, et al, Advance Sheets of the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts (1964). These ca.seS are the latest
pronouncements on 1Jhe subject in the United States. Both
cases analyze in detail the previous cases, and the substance of both cases is to the effect rtlhat the architect retains a common law copyright and that filing its plans with
the City Engineer or the zoning board or any other public
agency does not constitute a publication of its copyright so
as to lose it. Both cases further stand for the proposition
that constructing a building does not oo.nst:itute a publication nor a license to any third party to appropriate the said
plans and specifications. It should be noted in pas;ing
that both the Smith case and the Wood case are oases of
first impression. The Appellants set forth the salient portions of the Wood case, including its analysis of the pre-

vious cases, as follows:
"One Thomas Moylan retained Wood to dTaft plans for
the erection of two sections of buildings, each section
to oonta.in 110 apartments, in Woburn. After acceptance of the plans by Moylan 1lhey were filed with the
building department of Woburn and approved. Filing
WJa.S required in order to obtain a building permit.
Moylan then commenced erection of one of the two
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sections. He and Wood had entered into an agreement
lUlder the tenns of which Wood retained "all ... (its)
property rights, title and interest to the said plans for
all times." Moylan employed the defendant Portugal
to supervise construction of the building in accordance
with the plans. About the same time the defendant
Skene desired to erect on land owned by him in Norwood apartment houses similar to those of Moylan.
As the result of a coruipiracy between Skene and Portugal, Portugal left Moylan's employ, entered that of
Skene, and took with him to Skene plans of the Woburn buildings. Other defendants, the Wallaces, organized a real estate trust under the name of Windsor
Gardens Co. of Norwood, Massachusetts. The trust
bought Skene's Norwood land. Skene transmitted
the plans to the Wallaces whC? in tum gave them to
the defendants, Alonzo B. Reed, Inc. and its employee
Vincent Sullivan, to be copied. Reed's name and that
of Sullivan were affixed to the copied plans. These
plans were presented to the building commissioner of
Norwood and to others. In sum, Wood's plans were
copied and are being or were used to construct in Norwood buildings identical in design and specifications to
the Woburn buildings being erected. 1
Wood did not resort to statutory copyright, and we are
concerned solely with an examination of its rigihts under the common law. Common law copyright exists
in this Commonwealth. "That fue right of property
which an author has in his work continues until by

-------------------------Neither the substitute bill nor the original bill states
how close the first section of the W obum project was
to completion at the time the plans were copied by
some of the defendants. We shall assume a total completion.
1
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publication a right to their use has been conferred upon or dedicated to the public, has never been disputed."
Tompkins v. Halleck, 133 Mass. 32, 35. See F. w.
Dodge Co. v Construction Information Co. 183 Mass.
62, 63-65; Baker v. Libbie, 210 Mass. 599, 604." • • • •
"The princial issue in dispute is whether Wood lost whatever common law rights it had in its plans (1) when
they were filed with the Woburn building department,
or ( 2) when Moylan constructed a building from them.
We deal with a matter of first impression in this Commonwealth. Only six cases are in point from other
jurisdictions, none by a court of last resort. They
are in conflict and so is such literature as exists on
the subject.
The Reported Cases.
The first of the reported cases is Gendell v. Orr, 13
Phila. 191 (Pa. Common Pleas), decided in 1879. An
arehitect and builder erected a porch "of a new and
novel design and artistic beauty" (p. 191) along the
front of his house, which stood !bordering a highway.
Later he sough to enjoin the construction of oopies of
his porch. The court held that the completioo of such
a design and its exposure to public gaze for three
years constituted a general publication of the work.
There followed in 1903, Wrig1ht v. Eisle, 86 App. Div.
N. Y.) 356. An architect had prepared plans for a
private residence whioh were "duly filed with the
building department of the city of Mount Vernon' (p.
357). After the residence was built, the defendant
sought to procure a duplicate set of plans from the
arichitect. He declined to meet the architect's price
and 1Jhereafter retained a third party whose plans led
to the erection of a building "conforming substantially"
p. 357) to tlhe first residence. The arcthitect sought
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recovery for the value of the second set of plans. The
New York court held that when the architect had filed

the plans in a public office, he had "published his work
to the world" (p. 358) and lost his exclusive right to
them.

In Kurfiss v. Cowherd, 233 Mo.App. 397 (1938), an
arohitect drew plans to modernize an old house. As
modernized the house was opened to public inspection.
The pleadings indicate that 1Jhe defendants made copies
of the plans and used them in the construction of other
houses. The original plans were not filed in a public
office. Irt was held that "this unrestricted exhibition"
(p. 408) of 1Jhe modernized house was a publication of
the plans.
In 1959, on the authority of Wright v. Eisle, supra, the
Supreme Court of New York held that the filing of
plans with a building department in connection with
tlle erection of one house precluded the architect from
recovery of compensation from one defendant who
erected additional houses fi'om the same plans which
oame to 1him from his codefendanrt for whom the first
house had been built. Tumey v. Little, 18 Misc. 2d
(N.Y.) 462.
The earlier cases were reviewed in an extended dictum
in Desilva Constr. Corp. v. Herrald, 213 F. Supp. 184
(M.D. Fla. 1962). The Court was of opinion that the
filing of plans with a building department in order to
obtain a oonstruction permit was a publication that
terminated the common law copyright (pp. 194-195).
But the court stated that a completion and eoohlbition
of the building did not C0111Stitute such a publication of
the plans (pp. 195-196).
The finial case, Smith v. Paul, 174 Cal . .AJpp.2d 744
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(1959), differs from those already discussed.4 Smith
was not a licensed architect but was "in the business
of designing homes" (p. 746). He brought an action
against the owner of a house and the contractor who
buHt it on the ground that the plans employed in its
construction had been drawn by him for a ·third person.
The plans had been originally filed in a county office
as required by law in order to obtain a building permit, and a house had been constructed from them.
Smith had preserved his ownership in the plans in his
contract with his client. Paul had copied 1Jhem. The
court held that there had been only a limited publication of the plans and hence that the designer had not
lost his common law copyright in them. It pointed
out that "(t)he purpose of the requirement of filing
the plans in a government office is to protect the public from unsafe construction--not to take away from
the architect ·his common-law property rights . . . .
The architect derives no profit from the deposit of his
plans with the building department. He does not
thereby sell his work and has no intention of dedicating it to the public" (p.750). The court emphasized
that a filing was necessary in order to build. The
court also held that a mere viewing of the house by
guests of the owner, limited in number, constituted no
general publication of the plans. The reasoning was
that while exhibition of the exterior to the public
might cause a loss of the common law copyright to
the exterior design, "it . . . (was) not a general publication of the detailed plans themselves" (p. 758).
4 The common law copyright which exists by virtue
of the case law in this Commonwealth has been codified in California. Cal. Civil Code, Sec. 980-985.
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General and Limited Publication.
The concepts of general and limited publication alluded
to in Smith v. Paul, supm, were defined in the leading
case of Werckmeister v. American Lithographic Co.
134 Fed. 321, 326 (2d Cir.). Only a general publication terminates a common law copyright. It is "such
a disclosure, communication, circulation, exhibition, or
distribution of the subject of copyright, tendered or
given to one or more members of the general public, as
implies an abandonment of the right of copyright or
its dedication to the public" ( p. 326) . A limited publication is "one which communicates a knowledge of
its contents under conditions expressly or impliedly
precluding its dedication to the public" (p. 324). Further, to be general a publication must be such " ' . . .
as to justify the belief that it took place with the intention of rendering . . . (the) work common property.' '' American Tobacco Co. v. W erckmister, 207
U. S. 284, 299-300. Continental Cas. Co. v. Beardsley, 253 F.2d 702, 707 (2d Cir.) cert.den. 358 U. S. 816.
See White v. Kimmell, 193 F.2d 744, 747 (9th Cir.).
As more recently stated, "a . . . publication which
communicates the contents of a manuscript to a definitely selected group and for a limited purpose, and
without the right of diffusion, reproduction, distribution or sale, is considered a 'limited publication,' which
does not result in loss of the author's common-law
right to his manuscript, but . . . the circulation must
be restricted both as to persons and purpose, or it cannot be called a private or limited publication." White
v. Kimmell, supra, 746-747. American Visuals Corp.
v. Holland, 239 F.2d 740, 744 (2d Cir.). Continental Cas. Co. v Beardsley, supra, 706-707. While the
test is properly one of intention, it is clear that the
unexpressed, subjective intention of the creator can-
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not be allowed to govern (see National Comic Publications, Inc. v. FaW'Cett Publications, Inc. 191 F.2d 594,
598 (2d Cir.)); rather the implications of his outward
actions to the reasonable ousider are controlling.
The Federal cases thus recognize fully that 1Jhere may
be a fairly substantial but limited distribution of material SUSICeptible of statutory copyright without putting the material in the pulblic domain and without
forfeiture of the author's common law copyright in it.
It remains to determine whether a general publication
has occurred here.''
• • • In the light of what has been said, we hold that
the filing requirement and G. L. c 66, 10, give the public the right to inspect and, if necessary, to copy the
filed plans for purposes reasonably related to the objectives behind the filing requirement, for example,
to determine whether a building constructed in accordance with plans will comply with zoning and safety
laws. That right does not extend to making copies
whioh will impair the architect's common law copyright and property in the plans. It is not the purpose
of the filing requirement to facilitate and permit arehitootural plagiarism, or enahle one to obtain free of
charge the benefit of another's work and thus "to reap
where it has not sown." Int.erna.tion:al News Serv. v.
Associated Press, 248 U. S. 215, 239.
We conclude that the public filing of plans in the circumstances alleged is only a limited publication of them.
No objective intention to make a general publication
appears.

Construction of a Building
We next consider whether the completion and exposure
of the building which is the product of the plans constitutes such a general publication as will justify a copy-
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ing of the plans. Gendell v. Orr, 13 Phila. 191 (Pa.
Common Pleas), Wright v. Eisle, 86 App. Div. (N. Y.)
356 (dictum), and Kurfiss v. Cowherd, 233 Mo. App.
397, suggest that it does. In Kur&s v. Cowherd, supra, a house was modernized in accordance with plans
and thereafter opened to general public inspection.
The court reasoned although "it was not intended that
the public could or would take measurements . . . (of
the house) . . . the facts remain that there were no
restrictions to keep any one from so doing'' (233 Mo.
App. at 408), and that there had been a general publication of both the house and the plans. We regard the
correct rule as having been suggested by Tabor v.
Hoffman, 118 N. Y. 30. In tJhat case a repairman
made copies of the construction patterns used in the
manufacture of a pump. The issue was "whether
there is a secret in the patterns that yet remains a secret, although the pump has been given to the world"
(p. 35). The court held that "the patterns were a secret device that were not disclosed by the publication
of the pump . . . While the defendant couJd lawfully
copy the pump, because it had been published to the
world, he could not lawfully copy the patterns because
they had not been published, but were still, in every
sense, the property of the plaintiff, who owned not only the material substance, but also the discovery which
they embodied" (p. 37). See Tompkins v. Halleck,
133 Mass. 32,36. The rule of Ta:bor v. Hoffman, supra, can be, in our opinion, soundly extended to the
facts in this case. It has been so extended in Smirth
v. Paul, 174 Cal. App. 2d 744, 750: "(T) he fact that
a building is built from the plans and is open to the
gaze of the public . . . may be a publication of the
general design or idea of the building but not a pub~
lication of the exact plans whereby another may without effort other than that of tracing the work of the
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architect completely duplicate the latter's effort."11
It is contended that Smith v. Paul, supra, cannot serve
as a guide in resolving this case because access there
to a private home afforded to a limited number of people was quite different from access to the Woburn
apartments afforded to the general public. The argument is inapposite: "An architectural plan is a technical writing. It is capable of being copied only by similar technical writings, that is, by other plans, etc. A
structure is the result of plans, not a copy of them.
It follows that building a structure and opening it to
public gaze cannot be a publication of its plans." Katz,
supra, at 236. See White-Smith Music Publishing Co.
v. Apollo Co. 209 U.S. 1, 17-18; Nimmer on Copyright.

57.3.

Observation or measurement of the exterior and the
interior of a completed building can hardly be said to
approach an accurate copy of a set of plans. We do
not suggest that a common law copyright in the plans
is infringed by a drawing made from obsel"V'ation of
the interior or exterior of the buildings. Such a doctrine could lead only to a multiplicity of law suits between parties who had erected successively structures
11 A completed structure is no more a copy than the
exhibition of an uncopyrighted moving picture film,
the performance of an uncopyrighted radio script, or
the broadcast of an uncopyrighted radio script, all of
which acts have been held not to dedicate 1Jhe contents
to the public. (citations omitted.)" Smith v. Paul,
supra, at 755. See also Nimmer, Copyright Publication, 56 Oal. L. R. 185, 197: "(A) sine qua non of publication should be the acquisition by members of the
public of a possessory interest in tangible copies of the
work in question."
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of somewhat similar design. On the other hand, the
right fully to reproduce plans is a far more substantial aid to a builder unwilling to pay for architectural
services than the right to make sketches or drawings
of a completed structure.
We thus hold that the construction of the building from
the plans constitutes no publication of them at all.
We are of the opinion that the availability of Federal copyright protection for published material (17
U.S.C. [1858]) does not require the abandonment of
the separate protection afforded to unpublished material by the common law. See F. W. Dodge Co. v. Construction Information Co. 183 Mass. 62, 66. The Federal cases are consistent with this view. And, as
previously indicated, Congress has not enjoined such
an abandonment upon the states. 17 U. S. C. 2 (1958).
lt would be burdensome to require statutory copyright
of architectural plans not intended to be placed in the
public domain as a condition of preserving property
rights in them."
AI!. the court in the Wood case pointed out, all previous cases had been decided in courts of inferior jurisdiction. While their holdings are not to be dismissed without
examination, in no case should they be given the weight
of the Wood case, which was decided by the highest court
of the State of Massachusetts with full opportunity to ex-

amine, in retrospect, all previous case law, together with
all the legal and public policy arguments which had been
made. It was the considered opinion of the Massachusetts
court that, despite a number of contrary early holdings, the
trend of the law and the better, more equitable view favored protection of the architect's common law copyrights
in his plans.
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Not only are all the contrary cases not decisions of
courts of last resort but they are, for the most pa.rt, either
ancient, outdated cases decided 28 to 87 years ago. (Gend-ell v. Orr, supra l1879], Wright v. Eisle, supra [1903] and
Kurfiss v. Cowherd, supra, [1938]), or cases decided in the
same jurisdiction by later courts bound by the principle of
stare decisis (Tumey v. Little, supra.) The only other contrary case cited in the Wood case, even though holding
against the designer's assignee on other grounds, gave evidence of the liberal trend in the law when it stated unequivocally that completion and exhibition of the buil<ling
did not constitute unlimited publication of the plans. (DeSilva Construction Corp. v. Henald, supra.)
It would appear, therefore, that there remains before
the Court the question of damages. We respectfully contend that the damages to the .Appellants should be considered in the light of the following authorities:
Books, plans, portraits, heirlooms:
"The value to the Ol\Vller has been held to be the measure of damages for the loss of books kept for his personal use or of a manuscript having no market value."
15 Am. Jur. 536, § 127.
Damages recoverable for invasion of common-law
rights.
"In application of general principles relating to assessment of damages, determination of the amount of
damages recoverable in case of invasion of commonlaw rights rin literary property lies withrin the discretion of the jury upon consideration of the facts of :the
case, the fundamental rule of awarding a f1air compensation and indemnity for loss apparently is applied.

.. ...

18 Am. Jur. 2d 423 § 136
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"Other elements of damage to be considered are the
time spent by the party in preparation of his idea,
costs to him, if any, in preparing his idea in concrete
form for subm~ion to a buyer, and the fact that his
idea is of no further value to him after its use by the
defendant." ibid
"There are many instances in which the item of personal property destroyed, injured, or taken has no
market value in the normal sense of that term.. A
family photograph, a specially designed machine, a
manuscript, some lecture notes, and pl'ans of a draftsman can be examples of items of personal property
which have no market value beyond the value of the
paper or material which went into their construction.
These items are not bought and sold on the open market, and continued adherence to a rule of damages
which allows recovery only for a decrease in "market
value" would result in awarding the plaintiff only nOininal damages even though the court is convinced that
the injury is substantial. In this type of case, the
concept of measuring damages by the market value
of the item destroyed, injured, or taken is often discarded by the courts. The rule most frequently adopted for these cases is to award either the "actual" or
"intrinsic" value of the item or the "value to the owner" of the item."
22 Am. Jur. 2nd 215, § 149.
18 Am. Jur. 2nd 422 § 135, 136:
"NOTE: "and in the case of an unauthoriz.ed use of a
published manuscript, the value of the use thereof."
"The measure of damages for the unwarranted use by
a publlshing company of uncopyrighted :manuscripts
and stereotyped plates entrusted to its care is not the
value of the books produced, but the value of the use
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of the property itself and any damages that may be
done thereto in so using it , or, if the use amounts to
a conversion there the measw-e of damages will be the
value of the property it.self."
Stare v. Stare Journal Co.,
75 Neb. 275, 106 NW 434
In Smith v. Paul (supra) the claimed damage was:

"The reasonable value of the use (of the plans) of which
is $3500.00'.
Perhaps the Court determined damages on this basis.
In Wood v. Skene (supra), the Court said Wood's damage would be:
"the fair market value of a set of its plans."
The footnote to this quote contains the following language:
"Analogously, the Federal copyright statute provides in
part for the recovery of ' . . . such damages as the
copyright proprietor may have suffered due rto the infringement, as well as all the profits which the infringer
shall have made from such infringement . . ."
17 USC §lOl(b) (1958) See Sammons v. Colonial
Press, Inc. 126 F2d 341 (1st Circuit).
The Appellants believe that the damages are the reasonable value of the plans and specifications of the Plaintiff ,to--wit: $2,033.00. These are items that have no market value as such. The Respondent, Glover has been benefited by the reasonable value of these plans which he has
without right or oause appropriated and converted. It
would seem incongruous to allow him to obtain a $2,033.00
value with no corresp0111ding obligation for the same. These
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cases a:re greatly similar to the case of a stolen heirloom
or a unique writing which has no market value except in
respect to the value to its originator or owner. Because
the originator of this plan has, by his artistic talent, developed the arrangements which have a value, he should
be entitled to the benefit of the value of these concepts, for
there is no other way by which the Plaintiff can be compensated and the Respondent, Glover, not harmed. When
considered in its ultimate light, the Respondent has received
a benefit to this extent. Any other conclusion would be
to allow the Respondent, Glover, by reason of his misconduct, to benefit and profit at the expense of innocent parties and at the expense of the effort and talent of another.
The law does not condone nor favor misconduct and in
cases of doubt, all questions and issues of value should be
construed against the Respondent. We believe that by
the decisions of the Paul case ,and Wood case the same result would be reached and damage value would be the
same.
One could hardly say that the conduct of the Respondent, Glover, was not malicious and intentional. The Re-spondent well knew that what he was receiving was without right and was wrongfully obtained. He is not a novice
in the custom of the industry and surreptitiously availed
himself of the efforts of another for his own benefit. His
conduct was intentional, which is always necessary to justify the award of punitive damages. According to 34 Am.
Jur. 681-683, Malice can mean any of the following:
"In their legal sense the terms "malice" and "malicious"
have been variously defined, respectively, as the intentional commission of a wrongful act by one person to~
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ward another, without legal justification or excuse or
in other words, the wilful violation of a known ri ght'.
as the existence of a wrongful or harmful motive, not
necessarily any positive malignity or corruption, but
a wilful disregard of the rights of others, whether it
is to compass some unlawful end, or some lawful end
by unlawful means, or to do a wrong and unlawful act
knowing it to be such, although, .according to some
decisions. it is error to employ the term "malice" when
all that is intended is an intention to commit an unlawful act, without reference to ill feeling; as a state
of mind which prompts a conscious violation of law
to the prejudke and injury of another, as a condition
of the mind which shows a heart devoid of social consciousness and bent upon mischief, as characterizing
an action flowing from any wicked or corrupt motive:
as a depmved inclination on the part of a person to
disregard the rights of others, which intent is manifested by his injurious acts, as denoting a wicked intention of the mind, or an act done with a depraved
mind and attendant with circumstances which indicate
a wilful disregard of the 'rights and safety of others;
as a term of art importing wickedness and excluding
a just cause or excuse; as characterizing an act done
on purpose and with evil intent; and as a formed design of doing mischief to another or a wicked intention to do an injury to another. Legal malice is a
presumption of law, and is sometimes called malice in
law, in contradistinction to malice in fact, because the
law draws the inference from the fact. Malice in this
sense is sometimes referred to 'as implied malice."
1

"It has been noted in a prior section that a malicious

motive or intent will be presumed or implied in law
from the intentional commission of a wrongful act
which causes injury to another. A wrongful act will
be presumed to be malicious if the injurious conse-
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quences following it are those. which might natw'ally
be expected to result from it, and which the person
doing the act must be presumed to have had in mind
at the time. Malice in law may be inferred from the
absence of any just cause or excuse for the doing of
an act which has caused injury to another. Similarly,
the law will presume malice in some instances from a
lack of probable cause. Again, the inference of a malicious intent to inflict injury which would be impossible in the case of one acting without concert with
others may be drawn from the fact of conspiracy."
34 Am. Jur. 685, §6.
Malice as defined above, is not hard to see in the acts
of the Respondent. The record shows clearly that Glover
must have known his act was wrongful, for he knowingly
took the plans without authority (TR 114):
"Q. You never called Mr. Allen and asked him if you
could, did you?
A. No sir.
Q. Or Mr. Ashworth?
A. No.
Q. You never thought of calling them, did you?
A. No sir.
Q. You knew that architects charge for their services, didn't you?
A. Yes.
Q. You knew that what you were getting was a
work product of their effort, didn't you?
A. Yes sir."
Glover must have known that the plans belonged to
someone else because he knew they were not Richardson's
(TR 33) and both Richardson (TR 16) and Glover reported that the plans bore the Appellant's name (TR 113):
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"Q. (Continued by Mr. Howard) Now the Plans said,
Allen's Hi Spot American Fork, Ashworfu Architects", did
they not?
A. Yes sir.
Q.
A.

You knew who
Yes sir."

erew

the Plans, didn't you?

It is also clear that the Respondent did not act out of
innocence, for the record is clear that he was an experienced contractor (TR 24, 100, 103, 110). As such, it is
incredible to contend that he did not know he was violating
the proprietary rights of anotheT. Even a child would
have known it was wrong.
If the Respondent had merely taken a few ideas from

the general design, the evil intent or wrongful motive necessary to malice would not be found. But where, as here,
numerous drawings were made in which were copied the
exact dimensions of the outside of the building, the interior,
the thickness of the walls, size of rooms, counters and
equipment, among other things, it is difficult to believe
such an extensive "taking" could be committed without bad
faith and selfish motives.
Finally, malice may also be implied from the fact that
a conspiracy to take the J*ins existed between the Respondent and Mr. Richardson, the manager of the Hi Spot (TR
12. 13:
(Continued by Mr. Howard) When you say that
your business that was with him was drive-in cafel busi"Q.

ness, what did you mean?
A. Well certain locations and in the oafe and drlvein business.
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Were you going to go in business with him?
A. Sort of, yes.
Q. And that idea originated prior to your termmination with Allen's. is that true?
A. Yes.
Q. Would that idea have originated prior to October
of 1963--strike that.
Prior to October orf 1962?
A. I don't remember.
Q. Do you recall discussing the design and architecturcil features of the Drive In that you were operating in
American Fork, with Mr. Glover?
A. Yes.
Q. Now when you say you were going to go into
business with Mr. Glover, what was your relationship to
be?
A. There was no definite plans.
Q. When you discussed the architectural and design
features, what was the nature of that discussion?
A. I don't recall the exact discussion.
Q. Was anything said about obtaining Plans and Specifications for the American Fork Drive In as a basis for
the drive-in's that you and Mr. Glover might construct?
A. Yes."
Q.

The fact of conspiracy is confirmed by the admitted
faf'.t that the Respondent later took Richardson in as his
own manager. (TR 18, 26, 103, 104).
Although we believe we have proved malice, one does
not have to prove it. Intent alone is sufficient. The following case stands as authority for this proposition, to-wit:
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Press Publishing Co. v. Monroe
73 Foo 196.
In this case the Court allowed $5,000.00 punitive damages where the defendant had published a poem prematurely. There was no evidence of malice. All that was
required was that the act was wrongful and intentional.
(See also 18 Am. Jur. 2d 216, § 92 and Star Publishing Co.
v. Donahoe, 58 A 513).

POINT II
THE COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT ARE ERRONEOUS AND IN DIRECT CONTRADICTION TO THE
EVIDENCE PRESENTED:
A.

Finding of Fact Number Three:

"That plaintiffs completed the plans and specifications and
delivered a copy to the company and were paid in full for
their services."
There are several reasons why this finding of fact is
-Objectionable. The first is that it implies that the Appellants made a delivery of the plans in exchange and as consideration for the fee which they were paid. The very
most that can be said, if the facts are drawn from the evidence presented is that the A<ppellants "gave" their client
(permitted their client to use) a set of plans to facilitat.e
construction, to aid the client if repairs or alt.erations became necessary, and to allow the client the satisfaction of
seeing tangible evidmce of the work done for him. Not
only is this good business and good public relations; it is
the near universal practice of architects everywhere.
In view of the established custom, it is not too much to
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say that "giving" a client a copy of the plans would be,
in a sense, "expected" of an architect even though there
existed a complete understanding that the ownership of
the plans and right to control them remained with the designer.
In the instant case the re-cord at no point indicates
a "delivery" in the sense of an abdication of all one's
rights in exchange for consideration. It does refer to "giving'' the plans. (After referring to the standard American Institute of Architects contract, Mr. Dibblee asked Dell
Ashworth: (TR 55)
"Q. (Continued by Mr. Dibblee) This Agreement is
signed between you and Mr. Allen, is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And in accordance with this Agreement, I presume what you do. Mr. Ashworth, you give him a set of
Plans don't you?
A. Yes.
Q. And you give him a set of the Specifications,
don't you?
A. Yes.
Q. And he can make what use of the Plans that he
may desire, isn't that right?
A. We assume that he will use them on this project.
Q. But I mean, he may use them for whatever he
may desire, is that not right?
A. No, that is not exactly right."

Although the wchitect allowed the plans to be used,
the record indicates that the parties coosidered the fee to
be merely a payment for the limited use of the plans neces-

sary to the construction and maintenance of the partirular building in question, not a sale or assignment of all
rights in the plans to Allen's Products. The following are
the responses of Dell Ashworth, the architect: (TR 50)
"Q. Is there a market value for Plans and Specifications as such, your Plans and Specifications as such?
A. In other words, do we have a fixed way of determining our fee?
Q. No, I am asking you if you sell Plans and Specifications as such?
A. No, we do not.
Q. Is there a market value, so far as you know, for
these Plans and Specifications?
A. No."

-

It is obvious, then, that Appellants were not "paid in
full so that they no longer had rights to compensation if
the creative result of their past services were used again.

If this is true in relation to a client who had paid them to
design a first building, a fortiori it would be true of a third
person who had never paid Appellants anything.
It might still have been argued 1Jhat part of the fee was

for services such as supervision of ~on. But the
record shows that this element of a usual fee was not even
charged because these services were not perfonned (TR
63) . Also, the uncontroverted testimony of Appellants is
that an architect has exclusive ownership in the original
design ·and has the right, if he chooses, to charge the full
price even if he gives no additional service on a second building. But even if, arguendo, this testimony were ignored,
it would still be error to find ·as did the trial court that the
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Appellants "were paid in full for their services" because
the evidence is clear that the use of the plans was the
principal element of the fee.

B.

Finding of Fact Number Four:

"That in supervising the construction of the drive-in,
plaintiffs caused to have published and distributed to various building contractors, approximately 25 copies of a
complete set of the plans and specifications which could
later be purchased from plaintiffs by forfeiting a $25.00
deposit; that plaintiffs did not restrict the use to be made
of these plans."
The exact number of copies which Appellants loaned
to the contractors, although probably less than 25 (TR 58,
59, is not being disputed here since, in any event, the publication was still a limited one, both as to number and as
to manner of use. The Appellants do argue, hoW'elVer, and
the record substantiates the fact, that the plans and specifications w&e not purchasable. The testimony of the aI'chitect has already been quoted in which he testified that
the firm did not sell plans and specifications. (TR 50)
On a number of occasions, Mr. Dell Ashworth testified that while the plans and ideas had no known market
value, the reasonable value to him was $2,033: (TR 60)

"In answer to your lawyer's question, am I to assume
that you say the Plans were worth $2,033.00?
A. Yes.
Q. And that is what you are asking for here today?
A. I didn't say that, yoru asked me what the Plans
were worth.
Q. Well how much are yoru asking for here today?
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A.
Q.
A.

That is what I think the value of the Plans is.
$2,033.00?"
Yes."

(See also TR 51 and TR 52) . Since this testimony
stands unrefuted, it appears a bit ridiculous to say that the
Appellants would be willing to sell the plans for a mere
$25.00. A thorough search of the record reveals nothing
which would even suggest that the plans could be "pur-

chased" with a $25.00 deposit. Indeed, the record is replete with testimony to the contrary. Note the testimony
mony of Dell Ashworth: (TR 66)
Did you put out the 25 or 30 copies?
14, as I said.
And you got your usual $25.00 deposit?
A. Yes.
Q. And if the contractor does not bring the Plans and
Specifications back, he keeps the Plans and Specifications?
A. The $25.00 is to insure that he will bring them
back."
"Q.
A.
Q.

(TR 58):

"Now in addition to giving the Plans to the owner, you
also submit them to the contractor, is that correct?
A.

Q.

Yes.
And they pay a $25.00 fee for the Plans, correct?

A.

For the use orf them."

To the knowledge of counsel for the Appellants, the
only evidence in the record which gives any support to
the finding that the plans were "purchased" by the contractors is testimony to the effect that the $25.00 deposit
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would be forfeited if the plans were not returned. But
the very word "forfeit" it.self makes it clear that the $25.00
was merely a deposit required by the architects expressly
to insure that the plans would be returned. The testimony
already alluded to above shows that the plans were merely
loaned and that a sale or purchase of the pl,ans was never
oontemplated. A bit of reflection on the realities of the
construction business will show that loans such as this are
entirely necessary to the completion of any construction
project and that the realistic architect could never guarantee that all the copies of his plans would be returned the best he can do is require a small deposit to encourage
return of the plans.
The fact that the contractor is expected to return
them cannot be doubted (TR 58 and 66). nor can there be

doubt that the contractors knew the plans belonged to the
architects, both because of the customs of the trade and
because it is stipulated in the specifications which each
contractor is given (Exhibit 2). The architect's ownership
of the plans is implicit in Section 14, Page 4 which requires
the contractor to give the architect a deposit in return for
the use of the plans. The architect's ownership is explicitly recognized in Article 7 of the American Institute of
Architects' General Conditions of the Contract For the
Construction of Buildings (Exhibit 3) which was incorporated by reference into Section 1 of the specifications and
al~ made available separately (TR 45) to the contractors.
The aforementioned evidence is important not only
because it establishes that the contractors must have
known that the plans were the property of Appellants, but
also because of the duties which such ownership implies to

the bailee of the plans. It was not necessary to expressly
restrict the use to which the plans were put because it was
understood by the parties involved that the plans were to
be used in preparing bids and constructing the building,
not for general publication. That this was an implied condition of the loan of the plans is evidenced by the customary procedure of requiring deposits rather than merely
selling the plans to all interested parties. The fact that
contractors evidently did honor this implied condition that
they restrict their use of the plans to this particulax project is still another evidence 1Jhat they recognized that they
were restricted and that the Appellants had a right to the
exclusive use of the plans.
The apparent lack of restriction on ,the use of die plans
by Allen's Products can also be explained. The Allens
were old clients of the Appellants, having given them extensive business over the years in addition to the Hi-Spot
Restaurant (TR 42). For this reason, and because the
Appellants were working very closely with the Allens due
to the peculiaT requirements of this particular job, particularly with regards to the type and size of equipment
ordered, Appellants found it necessary to allow their clients somewhat more freedom to use the plans than is ordinarily the case.
Not only were there special reasons for giving the Allens access to the plans, but it is st:andard practice to do
so, and it is e~ of the architect.---4:he standard contract of th American Institute of Architects even provides
for it. (Exhibit 3, Article 4) This same standard form,
which the record indicates was the one Appellants customarily used (TR 55, 90), also contains a provision that
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ownership of the plans remains in the designer. Wasn't
it, therefore, reasonable for Appellants to assume that they
could safely allow their client to use a copy of the plans
\vithout jeopardizing their rights, especially since it was a
custom and practice of the trade?
The reasons why such relative freedom of use has become a customary practice are logical enough: it satisfies
the client's yen for some tangible evidence of what he has
asked the architect to design; it facilitates the efforts of
the client where, as here, he makes a contribution to the
design; it makes ~ible future repair work and alterations, and it is necessary for reasons of convenience, so a
copy will be available when and where it may be needed
quickly (Exhibit 3, Article 6).
The last two reasons probably explain why the plans
were left in the American Fork Drive In, making it possible
for Mr. Richardson to remove them for the unlawful uses
of the Respondent. Under the circwnstances, the freedom
which Appellan·ts allowed their client in the use of the
plans was reasonable and would not be inconsistent with
their exclm;ive ownership and right even though Appellants might allow Allen's to use the plans indefinitely. The
type of use which was granted was limited (TR 55, supra),
as the Allens themselves recognized sometime later when
they retained the Appellants again for the Springville HiSpot rather than use the plans without permission (TR 56).
C.

Finding of Fact Number Six:

"That during the year 1961 Allen's Products Company
used the plans and specifications in constructing a drive-in
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at Springville, Utah, and plaintiffs were employed on an
hourly basis to make modifications in said plans."
This Finding is directly contrary to the testimony
given at the trial. It is not a fair statement of the facts
to say that Appellants' fee for the Springville building was
merely a payment for services figured on an hourly basis.
The actual fee for the second building was computed by
a combination of a fixed percentage of construction costs
plus a charge for services based on an hourly rate (TR 65).
Actually, whether a client is charged on a percentage or an
hourly basis, even on an initial job with a client, is a matter to be decided at the discretion of the architect. Mr.
Willard Nelson, an architect who testified as an expert at
the trial, verified that fees may be and are commonly paid
on either an hourly or a percentage basis (TR 78), so there
was northing particularly unusual or compromising to Appellants' interests about the fact that part of Appellants' fee
for the Springville Hi-Spot was paid oo an hourly basis.
The fact that the fee for the second building was somewhat less than it had been for the Hi-Spot in American
Fork is likewise understandable and consistent with the
Appellants' exclusive rights. Mr. Dell Ashworth explained
it this way (TR 86) :
"Q.

You didn't get six percent on the second one, did

you?
A. No, this was by our own determination, Your
Honor.
Q. But if you did have the exclusive right, why didn't
you charge the six percent?
A. It is common practice to charge something less,
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and we merely charged for that work we do, where we are
working for the same client."
(TR 65):

"Q. But you didn't get your usual architects fee the
second time, did you?
A. We didn't ask for it.
Q. You didn't ask for it?
A. No, at the time we were employed on other work
for him."
As all the testimony points out, the amount of the fee,
although normally 6 percent of the construction oost, is
customarily subject to the architects' discretion where the
client has given the architect a great deal of business, and
especially where the new project also incorporates much
of a previously designed building, eliminating the need for
the extensive research, calculations, and time upon which
the normal 6 percent is based. The principle is not unlike
that practiced by any business which gives a discount to
good customers for volume buying. As Mr. Ashworth
pointed out, it is a wise business practice which probably
accounted for some of the return business which was later
given to Appellants.

ID.

Finding of Fact Number Nine:

"Plaintiffs' contract of employment did not provide that
plaintiffs retained all right, title and interest in and to the
architectural plans and specifications."
The above finding is particularly offensive because
there is not only abundant evidence to the contrary, but
there is no positive evidence upon which to base such a
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statement. The testimony of Mr. Ashworth that the contract used for the American Fork Hi-Spot was the Standard American Institute of Architects contract is repeated
and unchallenged (TR 54 to 55) :
"Q. In your contract, did you make any reference to
the Plans?
A. Yes, in other words, we use the standard American Institute of Architects contracts.
Q.
A.

ls that Exhibit 3 here sir?
No.

MR. HOWARD:

I will give you one here.

(Whereupon Mr. Howard handed to Mr. Dibblee
document above referred to.)

MR. HOWARD: I have the standard Agreement
if you would like to see it, Mr. Dibblee.
MR. DIBBLEE:

I would appreciate it.

(Continued by Mr. Dibblee) This Agreement is
signed between You and Mr. Allen, is that correct?
Q.

A.

Yes."

(TR 82):

Now before lunch, you stated that your agreement with Allen's was on a standard form agreement between owner and architect, is that true?
A. Yes."
"Q.

(TR 90):

"Q.

Are your contracts as to their general terms fairly

standard?

A.

Yes, we use the AIA standard form of contract.
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Q. Now on your other dealings with Allen's, did you
use the AJA standard form of contract?
A. Yes.
MR. DIBBLEE: Is that a question and answer?
MR. HOW ARD: I just asked him a question.
Q. (Continued by Mr. Howard) In your relationship with Allen's, has it been on the basis of the AJA Standard contract?
A. Yes."
It is also clear that the Standard AJA contract contains a section (provision 9) specifying that ownership ot
the plans and specifications remains with the architect unless otherwise provided.

The Appellant never at any time prior to trial thought
there was any dispute concerning the language of the AJA
contract. It was explained to the Respondent in the deposition of Mr. Ashworth. At the time of the trial the pro..
posed copy was not admitted because of the best evidence
rule, but the content of the agreement was admitted in the
form of .fue language in the specifications, (Exhibit 3) and
the testimony of Mr. Ashworth which stands unrefuted.
In addition to the evidence already mentioned, it should
be noted that a provision to the effect that the architect
retained all rights and ownership in the plans (Article 7)
is also part of the General Conditions of the Contractor for
the Construction of the Building (Exhibit 3), incorporated
into the written specifications by reference (TR 44, 46 and
47):
"All Drawings Spedficatioos and copies thereof furnished by the Architect are his property. They are
not to be used on other work, and, with the exception
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of the signed Contract set, are to be returned to him
om request, at the completion of the work."
The fact that both the contractors and the owners were
aware of this provision in the specifiications was also attested to by Mr. Ashworth (TR 45):

(After referring to Article 7, which specifies that ownership in the plans remains with the architect)
"Q. (Continued by Mr. Howard) I show you Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 3, and ask you if you can identify that?
A. This is the General Conditions of the Contractor
for the Construction of the Building, as approved lby the
American Institute of Architects.
Q. You go over the Specifications and Conditions with
the Ol\Wler before letting them go to the contractors?
A. Yes.
Q. So the owner is familiar with the terms too, is
that not true?

A.

Yes."

Finally, it should be mentioned that the record is replete with evidence that Appellants believed they had reserved ownership to the plans in themselves (TR 65, 85,
86) . In view of the one-sidedness of the evidence presented at the trial, Appellants wonder how the court below
could have arrived at ilts finding.
CONCLUSION

Since this is a case of first impressioo in Utah the
Court is free to consider the following public policy arguments:
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1. The right of an architect to compensation for the
use of his work-product is a relatively untrodden path of
law. The decision reached by the Court will be noted and
will have far-reaching importance on the law, on the architectural profession and the construction industry, not only
here in Utah, but nationally and perhaps further. This is
true because of the dearth of decisions, but is made even
more true by the fact that this is only the second time such
a question has come before a court of last resort.
This is a rapidly developing area of the law with half
the decisions coming since 1959. The trend is clearly towards greater protection for 1Jhe designer and a concern
for the equities af the situation. A decision in favor of the
Appellant would reinforce the trend and continue the development of the law; a contrary decision would be a significant backward step, a reversal in the progress the law
has made and a throwback to the technicalities and artificialities of ootmoded "legalism for its own sake." The
better rule, the equitable result toward which the courts
should be moving, is that which both protects the architect and discourages piracy.
2. The wrong decision in this case could have disastrous effects upon the architectural profession both locally
and nationally. Appellant in this case has followed the
customary practice of the profession in the limited manner
in which the plans were published and filed, in the manner
in which fees were charged for the second ill-Spot, and in
the way restrictions were placed on the use of the plans
and specifications. If Appellant loses this appeal, all architects will find themselves in an im~ible position: Their
clientele naturally expect them to allow their plans to be
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filed and used by the contractors and owners as a necessary part of construction; on the other hand, if they allow
the plans to be so "published" they stand in danger of the
claim that they "sold" their plans if one single contract.or
loses or fails to return his plans; if one set inadvertently
falls into the hands of an opportunist like the Respondent,
the architect may very well lose his ownership.

Affirmance af the existence of a common law copyright which is broad enough to protect most architects as
they customarily practice is essential to the well-being of
the architectural prof~ion. Very few architects copyright their plans formally, and they should not have to except in rare cases. The cost in construction delays, inefficiency and money would be tremendous. Realistic recognition of the actual practices and demands of the construction industry is imperative so architects may be given
more protection. Otherwise, grave injustices will surely
result.
3. A decision against the Appellant would hurt the
construction industry as much as it would hann architects.
If ideas and plans did not have to be paid for once the first
reproduction was built, the builder would ,be idiotic to ret2Jn an architect, since proven plans could be had for, at
most, the cost of a forfeiture for not returning them. If
the plans themselves could not be "bought" in this manner,
wholesale theft of ideas, a kind of architectural plagiarism,
would certainly be encouraged. Standards of construction might well be lowered if it became more profitable to
copy, borrow and steal in order to make one's own plans
rnther than use the services of a competent, professionally
trained architect.
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4. There is something intrinsically inequitable about
a legal principle which allows even the possibility that the
creative effort of one person might be taken from him
without payment by the taker. The architect's creation
is closely analogous to the work-product of the lawyer or
any other technical creative effort. While borrowing of
the general design features may be only borderline immoral behavior direct wholesale copying of the plans of
another is flatly tmethical conduct and should be denied
the support of the law.
To summarize the Appellants' position, a valuable
property right belonging to the Appellants has been ta.ken
and used without the consent of the Appellants. Respondent has been allowed to enrich himself, wilfully and lUljustly, without ever compensating or attempting to compensate the ower. This gross inequity should be rectified
by a reversal of the trial court's judgment; or, in the alternative, the case should be remanded to the lower court for
a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,

s/s Jackson B. Howard
Jackson B. Howard, for:
HOWARD AND LEWIS
Attorneys for Plaintiff
120 East 300 North
Provo, Utah

Mailed a copy of the foregoing, postage prepaid, to
Richard Dibblee, Attorney for Respondent, 530 Judge Build, 7 ,n.
ing, Salt Lake City, Utah, on the_ _/\..~_ _ _day of
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